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CHAPTER 2 
Corporations 
SURVEY Stafft 
§ 2.1. Application of the business purpose and fairness test to public 
corporations where a director/controlling stockholder stands on both sides 
of a merger transaction.* While Massachusetts courts have long recog-
nized the fiduciary obligations of corporate directors and controlling 
stockholders in close corporations, 1 they have not addressed the fiduciary 
duties of controlling shareholders involved in the merger of a publicly 
held corporation. During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court 
considered in Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc. 2 the 
fiduciary obligation of a controlling stockholder/director who executes a 
merger to eliminate public ownership in a publicly held corporation. In 
Coggins, the Court established a two part test for reviewing such cash 
freeze-out mergers. 3 
In other jurisdictions, courts analyzing the duties of directors and 
controlling shareholders in freeze-outs4 of publicly held corporations em-
ploy the "business purpose" test,5 the "fairness" test6 or a combination 
of the two tests.7 Under a business purpose test, the court determines 
whether the corporation, acting through its directors, had any legitimate 
business purpose in executing the merger other than attempting to force 
t Deborah A. Kolodziej, Kyle M. Robertson, Michael J. Southwick. 
*Deborah A. Kolodziej, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 2.1. 1 Leader v. Hycor, Inc., 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. 215, 222, 479 N.E.2d 173, 177; 
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 848-49, 353 N.E.2d 657, 661-62 
(1976); Horizon House-Microwave, Inc. v. Bazzy, 1985 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 190, 198, 
486 N.E.2d 70, 76. 
2 1986 Mass. Adv. Sh. 525, 492 N.E.2d 1112 (1986). 
3 Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 1986 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 534, 492 
N.E.2d at 1118. 
4 Freeze-outs are "transactions in which those in control of a corporation use their control 
to force non-controlling shareholders to lose their status . . . of that corporation." R. 
CLARK, CoRPORATE LAw 499 (1986). Ill a cash freeze-out merger such as in the Coggins 
case, the minority shareholders received cash for their shares. See, e.g., Coggins, 1986 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 528, 492 N.E.2d at 1115. 
s See, e.g., Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563,568-71 (5th Cir. 1974); Gabhardt 
v. Gabhardt, 267 Ind. 370, 385, 370 N.E.2d 345, 356 (1977). 
6 See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). 
7 See, e.g., Klurfeld v. Equity Enterprises, 79 A.D.2d 124, 134-35, 436 N.Y.S.2d 303, 
309 (1981). 
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out the minority shareholders.8 The entire fairness test, as established in 
Delaware in Weinberger v. UOP, lnc., 9 evaluates the entire transaction 
and considers whether the directors and controlling shareholders satisfied 
their fiduciary duty to the corporation by providing shareholders with 
both fair dealing and fair price. In Coggins, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court concluded that a merger transaction in which a controlling 
shareholder eliminates a minority interest must satisfy both the business 
purpose and the entire fairness analysis. 10 
Under Massachusetts law, all shareholders in a close corporation owe 
to each other a duty of utmost good faith and loyalty in conducting the 
affairs of the corporation. 11 This stringent fiduciary duty is imposed on 
the shareholders because the special nature of close corporations poses 
an inherent danger to minority interests. 12 The applicable test when mi-
nority shareholders in a close corporation sue the majority shareholders 
for breach of this duty of utmost good faith and loyalty is whether the 
majority can demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for their ac-
tions.13 If the defendant does demonstrate a business purpose, and mi-
nority shareholders can demonstrate that there is an alternative course 
of action for achieving the objective that is less harmful to the minority 
interest, 14 the court will weigh the business purpose against the alterna-
tive.15 This two prong test is applicable to alleged breaches of fiduciary 
duty by shareholders in a close corporation. 
The dispute in Coggins centered around the activities of a director and 
controlling stockholder of the New England Patriots Football Club, Inc. 
("Old Patriots"), William H. Sullivan, 16 In 1960, Sullivan organized the 
Old Patriots, owners of an American Football League franchise, and by 
• Gabhardt; 267 Ind. at 388, 370 N.E.2d at 356 (1977). 
9 457 A.2d 701, 711 (fair dealing "embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, 
how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed . . . . [Fair price] relates to the 
economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger . . . . ") 
1° Coggins, 1986 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 534, 492 N.E.2d at IllS. 
11 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 367 Mass. 578, 593, 328 N.E.2d 
505, 515 (1975). See Cardullo v. Landau, 329 Mass. 5, 8, 105 N.E.2d 843 (1952) for a 
discussion of the fiduciary duties of partners. 
12 See Donahue, 367 Mass. at 591-93, 328 N.E.2d at 514-15. Court notes that dissident 
stockholders in public corporations can sell their stock to regain some of their capital, an 
opportunity not available for shareholders in a close corporation. Id. at 591, 328 N.E.2d at 
514. Court also comments on the trust and confidence whlclnire essential in a close 
corporation. Id. at 592-93, 328 N.E.2d at 51J.~-----
13 Wilkes, 370 Mass. at 851, 353 N.E.2d at 663. 
14 Id. at 851-52, 353 N.E.2d at 663. 
"Id. at 852, 353 N.E.2d at 663. 
16 Coggins, 1986 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 527, 492 N.E.2d at ll14-15. The corporation was 
originally named the American League Professional Football Team of Boston, Inc. Id. at 
526, 492 N.E.2d at ll14. 
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April 1974, accumulated 23,718 of the 100,000 shares of privately owQed 
voting common stockY He also owned 5,499 of the 120,000 shares of 
publicly owned non-voting common stock. 18 After his ouster from the 
presidency of the corporation in 1974, Sullivan sought to regain control. 19 
By late 1975, Sullivan owned or controlled all of the 100,000 shares of 
voting common stock.20 To finance the purchase of the shares, S~llivan 
borrowed over five million dollars from two lenders. 21 Both loans required 
Sullivan to reorganize the corporation to allow for the use of the corpo-
ration's income to repay Sullivan's personal obligations under these 
loans. 22 To meet this condition, Sullivan had to eliminate the publicly 
owned shares. 23 
Sullivan formed a new corporation, New Patriots Football Club, Inc. 
("New Patriots") with exactly the same board of directors as the Old 
Patriots board of directors and planned a merger of the two corpora-
tions.24 Under the merger agreement, shareholders of the publicly-held 
non-voting stock of the Old Patriots would exchange this stock for $15 
per share, and Sullivan would exchange his 100,000 shares of Old Patriots 
stock for 100% of the New Patriots stock.25 This exchange would cause 
a freeze-out of public ownership in the corporation. 26 Sullivan obtained 
the requisite majority approval of the agreement by each class of affected 
stock,27 and on January 31, 1977, the merger was consummated.28 Cog-
gins, however, the owner of ten shares of non-voting common stock, 
believed that the merger was illegal, voted against the transaction, and 
17 /d. at 527, 492 N.E.2d at 1114. Ten shareholders formed the original corporation. In 
return for their contributions, each received 10,000 shares of voting common stock. /d. 
18 /d. Four months after the corporation was formed, it sold 120,000 shares of non-voting 
common stock to the public. 
19 /d. 
20 /d. Sullivan purchased, or agreed to purchase at some future date, all of the shares he 
did not own at a price of $102 per share. !d. 
21 /d. 
22 /d. at 527-28, 492 N.E.2d at 1114-15. Sullivan borrowed a total of over five million 
dollars from the LaSalle National Bank of Chicago a_nd the Rhode Island Hospital National 
Bank. [(/. at 527, 492 N.E.2d at 1114. 
23 /d. at 527-28,492 N.E.2d at 1115. This was a finding of fact made in an earlier Patriots 
case, which the trial judge in Coggins adopted as his own. /d. at 528 n.4, 492 N.E.2d at 
1115 n.4. 
24 /d. at 528, 492 N.E.2d at 1115. 
25 /d. 
26 Id. at 532-33,492 N.E.2d at 1117. 
27 /d. at 528-29, 492 N.E.2d at 1115. Prior to its amendment in 1976 and after 1981, the 
merger statute required two thirds approval of each class of stock. G.L. c. 156B 
§ 78(c)(l)(iii) (as amended by St. 1976, c. 327) (cited in Coggins, 1986 Mass. Adv. Sb. at 
528-29 and n.7, 492 N.E.2d at 1115 and n.7). 
28 Coggins, 1986 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 529, 492 N.E.2d at 1115. 
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initiated suit. 29 He was certified the representative of a class of share-
holders who, like himself, sought to void the merger. 30 
The superior court held for the plaintiffs and found that the merger 
failed to serve any legitimate business purpose separate from the personal 
interests of Sullivan.31 The court rejected the defendants stated business 
justifications, noting that the sole reason for the merger was to restructure 
the Patriots so that Sullivan could satisfy his five million dollar debt to 
the lenders. 32 In addition to considering the business purpose, the court 
considered the adequacy of disclosure and the fairness of the price and 
found the merger illegal. 33 Instead of granting the usual remedy of res-
cission upon a finding of an illegal merger, the court granted the plaintiffs 
rescissory damages and ordered further hearings on the specific amount. 34 
On direct appellate review, the Supreme Judicial Court initially con-
sidered whether shareholders can invoke judicial review of a merger that 
technically complied with the merger statute. 35 The Court began by noting 
29 Id. at 529, 492 N.E.2d at ll15-16. 
30 Id. at 529, 492 N.E.2d at 11l5-16. Two related cases based on the Patriots merger are 
Pavlidis v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 737 F.2d 1227 (lst Cir. 1984) and 
Sarroufv. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 1986 Mass. Adv. Sh. 542, 492 N.E.2d 
ll22 (1986). The Pavlidis plaintiff class were stockholders who voted to accept the cash 
offer for their stock, claiming that they were induced into acceptance by a misleading proxy 
statement. Pavlidis, 737 F.2d at 1229. The Sarroufplaintiff class consisted of stockholders 
who, rather than accepting the offering price of $15 per share, sought the statutory remedy 
of appraisal. Sarrouf, 1986 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 543, 492 N.E.2d at 1124. 
31 Coggins, 1986 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 535, 492 N.E.2d at 1115. 
32 Id. The defendant contended that a NFL policy requiring majority ownership in a 
single family or individual required elimination of public ownership. /d. The superior court 
rejected this argument, noting that the rationale behind the NFL policy was to eliminate 
internal management disputes in NFL franchises. Although Sullivan did not own a majority 
of the non-voting stock, he owned all of the voting stock and this satisfied the goal of the 
NFL policy. ld. 
33 /d. at 534, 492 N .E.2d at 1118. 
34 ld. at 529, 492 N.E.2d at 1116. Following the decision, the plaintiffs of two related 
cases, Pavlidis, 737 F.2d 1227 and Sarrouf, 1986 Mass. Adv. Sh. 542, 492 N.E.2d 1112, 
moved to intervene. Coggins, 1986 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 529-30, 492 N.E.2d at 1116. The 
Pavlidis plaintiffs were allowed to permissively intervene as were the Sarrouf plaintiffs 
who had not been granted relief in their own case. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court ruled 
that the trial judge erred as a matter of law in permitting the Pavlidis and Sarrouf plaintiffs 
to intervene. ld. at 539-40, 492 N.E.2d at 1121. An additional issue considered by the 
Supreme Judicial Court on appeal was the decision to certify the case as a class action. Id. 
at 537-38, 492 N.E.2d at 1120-21. The Court ruled that class certification was proper. Jd. 
at 538, 492 N .E.2d at 1121. 
35 Coggins, 1986 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 532,492 N.E.2d at 1117. G.L. c. l56B, § 98 provides 
The enforcement by a stm;kholder of his right to receive payment for his shares 
in the manner provided in this chapter shall be an exclusive remedy except that this 
chapter shall not exclude the right of such stockholder to bring or maintain an 
appropriate proceeding to obtain relief on the ground that such corporate action will 
be or is illegal or fraudulent as to him. 
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that in the context of close corporations, the statute does not deprive 
judicial review of the independent fiduciary principle governing the be-
havior of majority stockholders. 36 The Court recognized that similar dan-
gers of self-dealing and breach of fiduciary duties exist where a director/ 
controlling stockholder seeks to eliminate public ownership in a corpo-
ration.37 Thus, the Court concluded that in such a situation, the motives 
of the controlling stockholder are a proper subject of judicial inquiry 
despite technical compliance with the merger statute.38 Finally, the Court 
stated that a controlling shareholder, who is also a director standing on 
both sides of the merger transaction, maintains the burden of showing 
that his or her actions did not violate his or her duty of loyalty to the 
corporation. 39 
Mter determining that judicial scrutiny was appropriate, the Supreme 
Judicial Court affirmed the superior court's decision that the merger was 
illegal. 40 The Court noted, however, that although the superior court 
reached the proper result, it failed to structure its analysis properly.41 
While the trial court examined the business purpose, the adequacy of 
disclosure and the fairness of price, the Supreme Judicial Court applied 
a more structured analysis.42 
In its consideration of the appropriate analysis, the Court looked to 
the approach of the Delaware courts, experienced in the law of corpo-
rations. Although the Court acknowledged that Delaware courts adhere 
only to the fairness test,43 the Court stated that the business purpose test 
was an additional useful device for reviewing cash freeze-out mergers.44 
Consequently, the Court stated that in a cash freeze-out merger situation, 
the director/controlling shareholder must show first that the merger ad-
36 Coggins, 1986 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 532-33,492 N.E.2d at 1117. 
37 Id. at 532-33, 492 N.E.2d at 1117. 
38 /d. at 532, 492 N.E.2d at 1117-18. See also Leader, 395 Mass. at 221, 479 N.E.2d at 
177. 
39 Coggins, 1986 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 533,492 N.E.2d at 1118 (citing Geddes v. Annaconda 
Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 599 (1921)) (because directors have a fiduciary duty to 
the corporation, when the fairness of a transaction between corporations having common 
directors is challenged, fairness and adequacy of consideration must be shown). 
40 Coggins, 1986 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 530, 492 N.E.2d at 1116. 
41 ld. at 534, 492 N.E.2d at 1118. 
42Jd. 
43 Id. at 531, 492 N.E.2d at 1116-17. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715. In Weinberger, 
the Supreme Court of Delaware eliminated the business purpose prong which it had pre-
viously adhered to in cases, such as Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), 
stating that "we do not believe that any additional meaningful protection is afforded minority 
shareholders by the business purpose requirement .... " 457 A.2d at 715. 
44 Coggins, 1986 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 531, 492 N.E.2d at 1117. The Court never stated 
specifically what the business purpose test adds to the entire fairness test. 
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vanced a legitimate business purpose.45 If the defendant satisfies this 
sho,wing, he or she next must prove that the transaction was fair to the 
minority shareholders. 46 
In applying the test, the Court held that the defendant did not satisfy 
the first inquiry because the merger failed to serve any valid corporate 
objective unrelated to the personal interest of the majority shareholder-.4 ( 
The Court stated that the sole purpose of the merger was to facilitate 
repayment of Sullivan's personal indebtedness to the banks.48 Moreover, 
the Court noted that the superior court rejected the defendant's claim 
that a National Football League rule requiring majority ownership by an 
individual or family necessitated the elimination of public ownership. The 
superior court had concluded that because Sullivan possessed unques-
tionable authority to act for the corporation, this satisfied the rule's 
underlying policy of avoiding internal management confticts.49 Because 
the Court found that the merger of the Old Patriots and New Patriots 
served no legitimate business purpose, it did not go on to consider 
whether the transaction was fair to minority interests. 50 
After determining that the plaintiffs were entitled to relief, the Court 
considered the appropriate remedy for the shareholders. 51 Reasoning that 
the normal equitable remedy for an illegal freeze-out, rescission of the 
merger, would be inappropriate due to the passage of time and reliance 
by third parties on the transaction, the Court decided to award the 
plaintiffs rescissory damages based on the present value of the corpora-
tion. 52 The Court specifically rejected appraisal damages based on the 
1976 value, noting that this would make the suit a nullity by giving the 
plaintiffs exactly the amount of money they would have received had 
they never initiated suitY Accordingly, the case was remanded for de-
termination of the present value of the Old Patriots merger as if the 
merger has never taken place.54 
45 /d. at 534, 492 N.E.2d at 1118. 
46 !d. at 535, 492 N.E.2d at 1118. 
47 /d. at 534, 535, 492 N.E.2d at 1118, 1119. The Court cited Widett & Widett v. Snyder, 
for the proposition that the director of a corporation violated his or her fiduciary duty to 
the corporation when he or she failed to disclose to the corporation that a mortgage 
assignment transaction personally benefited the director and was of no benefit to the 
corporation. /d. (citing Widett, 392 Mass. at 778, 786, 467 N.E.2d at 1312, 1317 (1984)). 
48 Coggins, 1986 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 535,492 N.E.2d at 1119. 
49 /d. 
50 /d. 
51 !d. 
52 Coggins, 1986 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 535.,-36, 492 N.E.2d at 1119-20. 
53 /d. at 536,492 N.E.2d at 1119-20. 
54 /d. at 536-37, 492 N.E.2d at 1120. The Supreme Judicial Court ordered the trial court 
to award the plaintiffs what they would receive if the merger was undQne and the old 
corporation put together again. /d. at 537, 492 N.E.2d at 1120. The court was also ordered 
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Although the Coggins decision establishes a two prong test for exam-
ining cash freeze-out mergers of publicly held corporations, it fails to 
address several important issues. For example, while the Court relied 
upon the fiduciary standard for transactions involving close corporations, 
it did not elaborate on the nature of this duty in public corporations,55 
Also, because the entire fairness test considers business justifications, it 
is not clear what the business purpose prong adds to the fairness ap-
proach. Thus, the Supreme Judicial Court's analysis in Coggins raises 
as many questions as it resolves. 
The Coggins decision focused on the special dangers involved when a 
controlling stockholder and director stands on both sides of a merger 
transaction which eliminates the public. The likelihood of personal mo-
tivation, with little concern for the corporation or its minority sharehold-
ers, seems great in such situations. 56 Similar dangers of self-dealing and 
disregard for minority interests exist in close corporationsY Perhaps for 
this reason, the Court frequently analogized the fidu~iary obligati<;>ns of 
the majority interest in cash freeze-out mergers of public corporations to 
those of the majority in closely held corporations. 58 However, the court 
did not specifically address the differences between fiQuciary obligp.tions 
of directors/controlling stockholders in public corporations as compared 
to close corporations. 59 
The Coggins court concluded that merger transactions involving cor-
porations with common boards of directors must show a legitimat~ busi-
ness justification, apart from any personal purposes, for the transaction. 
Even if a valid corporate purpose is foqnd, the defendant must fprther 
prove that the entire transaction was fair to the minority shareholders. 
Although the Coggins Court specifically stated that the business purpose 
test was an additional useful analysis to the entire fairness test, 60 the 
Court failed to state specifically what the tests add to each other. The 
to include in the present value the amount wrongfully diverted from the corporation's assets 
by the defendants. /d. 
" See /d. at 532-33, 532 n.13, 492 N.E.2d at 1117-18, 1117 n.l3 (citing Leader, 395 Mass. 
at 221, 479 N.E.2d at 177, Pupecki v. James Madison Corp., 376 Mass. 212, 216-17, 382 
N.E.2d 1030, 1033 (1978), and American Discount v. Kaitz, 348 Mass. 706,711, 206 N.E.2d 
156, 160 (1965). 
56 See Elephante, Corporations, 1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAWS§ 17.1, at 457-58. 
57 See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of close corporations. 
58 See Coggins, 1986 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 532-33,492 N.E.2d at 1117. 
59 Coggins, 1986 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 532 n.l3, 492 N.E.2d at 1117 n.l3 (quoting Donahue, 
367 Mass. at 593-94, 328 N.E.2d at 515-16). The Court's only treatment of this issue was 
in a footnote, in which the Court distinguished the stricter standard imposed on close 
corporations from the "less stringent standard of fiduciary duty to which directors and 
stockholders of all corporations must adhere". ld. 
60 Coggins, 1986 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 531,492 N.E.2d at 1117. 
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fairness test considers if the transaction included fair dealing and fair 
price.61 Under the fair dealing question, the court investigates the initia-
tion, the structure, and the negotiation of the transaction.62 Fair dealing 
also encompasses a duty of candor about the transaction.63 Fair price 
includes economic considerations, including any element which affects 
the value of the transaction.64 Given the fair dealing requirement, it is 
difficult to see what the business purpose test adds to the fairness test. 
Applying an entire fairness test to the Coggins case, for example, Sullivan 
would have had to disclose his personal interest in the merger transaction 
to satisfy his duty of candor. 
One notable difference between the Coggins approach and a test which 
looks solely at the fairness of the transaction is the effect of shareholder 
approval of a merger. Utilizing the fairness analysis, had the informed 
shareholders approved the merger after Sullivan's disclosure of his per-
sonal interest, the transaction would have satisfied judicial scrutiny, pro-
vided that the shareholders were given a fair price for their shares.65 
Under the holding in Coggins, however, even if the fully informed share-
holders approved the transaction, it would be illegal due to lack of a 
business purpose. Thus, when focusing on motives in the context of the 
fair dealing prong of the entire fairness approach, fully informed share-
holders retain the option to approve the merger. 
The Supreme Judicial Court left open a number of important questions 
posed by the Coggins case. First, the Court did not establish the differ-
ences between the fiduciary obligations of directors in close corporations 
and directors in publicly held corporations. Also, the Court failed to 
identify what additional function the business purpose test serves in 
analyzing the merger of a publicly held corporation with another corpo-
ration. Furthermore, the Court failed to provide guidance on what suf-
ficed as a legitimate corporate purpose in a merger situation. Clearly, 
repaying Sullivan's personal indebtedness failed to serve any legitimate 
business purpose. Finally, the Court never even reached the inquiry into 
the fairness test. Therefore, what this fairness test entails in mergers 
involving publicly held Massachusetts corporations remains unclear. 
Thus, the full implications of the Coggins approach await further devel-
opment. 
§ 2.2. Fiduciary Duty- Closely Held Corporations.* During the Survey 
year the Supreme Judicial Court in Goode v. Ryan addressed the question 
61 See, e.g., Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711. 
62Jd. 
63 /d. 
64 /d. 
6S /d. 
*Kyle M. Robertson, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
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whether the fiduciary duty which shareholders in a close corporation owe 
one another requires the corporation or the majority shareholders to 
purchase the shares of a minority shareholder upon the death of that 
shareholder. 1 The Court answered the question in the negative, holding 
that neither the majority shareholders nor the corporation was under a 
duty to purchase the minority shares. 2 The majority's refusal to purchase 
the shares, stated the Court, was simply one of the risks of ownership 
of minority shares in a close corporation.3 
In the 1975 case of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 
the Court established the rule that shareholders in a close corporation 
owe one another the same fiduciary duty of utmost good faith and loyalty 
as partners owe one another. 4 Applying this rule, the Donahue Court 
held that where a close corporation seeks to purchase shares from a 
controlling shareholder, it also must offer to purchase shares ratably from 
all other shareholders.5 Thus, the Court observed the "true plight" of the 
minority shareholder in a close corporation who may be oppressed by 
majority control, with few avenues of escape from a disadvantageous 
situation. 6 Noting that in these circumstances the close corporation more 
closely resembles a partnership as compared with a public-issue corpo-
ration,? the Court stated that, as in a partnership, the relationship among 
the shareholders must be one of trust, confidence and absolute loyalty.8 
This rule was further developed in a case involving the majority share-
holders' termination of a minority shareholder's employment without 
cause.9 In the 1976 case of Wilkes v. Springfield Nursing Home, Inc., 
the Court, "concerned that untempered application of the strict good 
faith standard enunciated in Donahue" 10 would unduly hamper the ma-
jority's ability to manage the corporation, sought to balance the majori-
ty's rights to "selfish ownership" against their fiduciary duty owed to the 
minority. 11 In order to accommodate these competing interests, the 
Wilkes Court 'established a two part analysis of actions of the controlling 
shareholders when a minority shareholder alleges a breach of fiduciary 
§ 2.2. 1 397 Mass. 85, 489 N.E.2d 1001 (1986). 
2 Id. at 92, 489 N.E.2d at 1005. 
3 Id. 
4 367 Mass. 578, 593, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975). The Donahue Court defined a close 
corporation as typified by: "(1) a small number of stockholders; (2) no ready market for 
the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder participation in the manage-
ment, direction and operations of the corporation." Id. at 586, 328 N.E.2d at 511. 
5 Jd. at 598, 328 N.E.2d at 518. 
6 Id. at 591-92, 328 N.E.2d at 514-15. 
7 Id. at 586, 328 N.E.2d at 512. 
8 Id. at 587, 328 N.E.2d at 512. 
9 Wilkes v. Springfield Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976). 
10 Jd. at 850, 353 N.E.2d at 663. 
11 /d. at 850-51, 353 N.E.2d at 663. 
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duty by the majority. 12 First, the Coqrtasks whether the controlling group 
can demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for its action;13 and, sec· 
ond, if a business purpose is advanced, the minority shareholders are 
allowed to demonstrate that the legitimate objective could have been 
achieved through another course of a~tion less harmful to the minority's 
interest. 14 Thus, the Wilkes decision limited the impact of Donahue by 
allowing the majority to demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for 
its action alleged to violate the strict fiduciary duty to the harm of the 
minority. 
In Goode v. Ryan, the most recent case of this group, the Supreme 
Judicial Court ruled that the refusal of the majority shareholders of a 
close corporation to purchase shares from the estate of a deceased mi-
nority shareholder did not violate the fiduciary duty owed to the minority 
shareholder. 15 Plaintiff, Thomas E. Goode, was the administrator of the 
estate of Aljce M. Marr, a deceased minority shareholder of the Glouces-
ter Ice & Cold Storage Co. (Gloucester). 16 Defendants were shareholders 
of Gloucester, as well as shareholders, officers or directors of defendant 
North Shore Management & Investment Co. (North Shore), the majority 
shareholder of Gloucester. 17 It was undisputed, and the Court assumed, 
that Gloucester was a close corporation: the number of shareholders was 
small, no ready market existed for Gloucester stock, and majority share-
holder participation in the management of Gloucester was substantial. 18 
During the winter of 1977-78, Goode informed Gloucester management 
that he wished to sell, or for the corporation to redeem, Alice Marr's 
minority shares of Gloucester stock. 19 A few months later, North Shore 
offered to purchase the minority shares from the Marr estate at $12.50 a 
share, or approximately one-third of its book value of $38.67 a share. 20 
12 See i(i. at 851-52, 353 N.E.2d at 663. 
13 Id. at 851, 353 N.E,2d at 663. The Court acknowledged that in asking this question, 
the majority must be afforded some room to maneuver in establishing the business policy 
of the corporation. I d. 
14 Id. at 851-52, 353 N.E.2d at 663, 
"397 Mass. at 91, 489 N.E.2d at 1005. 
16 Id. at 86, 489 N.E.2d at 1002. The estate owned 800 shares of tbe 11,340 shares 
outstanding of Gloucester common stock. I d. Gloucester manufactured and sold ice to the 
fishing industry through its operatil18 entity, Cape Pond Ice Co. Id. 
17 Id. Defendants to1ether owned 1!,125 shares (71.6%) of Gloucester's stock. Id. 
18 Id. See supra note 4 for definition of a close corporation. The Court noted that 
defendants John W. Ryan and John D. Hodges served as president and treasurer of 
Gloucester since 1978, and that John W. Ryan, John D. Hodges, William A. Eagan, Jr., 
James A. Ryan, and John D. Hodges, Jr. had been elected members of the Gloucester 
board of directors annually since 1978. I d. at 86 n.3, 489 N .E.2d at 1002 n.3. 
19 Id. at 87, 489 N.E.2d at 1002, 
20 I d. The source of the book value was the unaudited financial statement of Gloucester 
for the year ending December 31, 1977. Id. Presumably this was an average price per share, 
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Goode declined, and the offer was withdrawn. 21 Goode subsequently 
failed to take advantage of ~everal opportunities to dispose of his shares, 
unrelated to the North Shore offer. 22 
At the August 1982 annual meeting Goode renewed his request that 
the corporation redeem the shares. 23 Nothing in Gl()ucester's articles of 
organization or by-laws, or in any shareholder agreement required the 
corporation or the remaining shareholders to redeem its stock upon the 
death of a shareholder. 24 The president of Gloucester, John W. Ryan, 
responded in a letter by denying any legal obligation of the directors to 
redeem the stock. 25 Ryan agreed, however, to present to the directors 
any price and payment terms acceptable to Goode. 26 In reply, Goode 
without reference to shares which constitute a majority, or minority interest. See 12A W. 
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRlVATE CORPORATIONS§ 5600 (rev. perm. ed. 
1984) (actual value of 'Closely held corporate stock is determinable from the then net worth 
of the corporation divided by the number of bona fide shares issued and outstanding). 
Professors O'Neal and Thompson have noted that majority shareholders value stock ac-
cording to the amount of control the stock carries. I F.H. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, 
O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 2: !5, at 38-39 (2d ed. 1985) [here-
inafter OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS). A minority shareholder views all shares 
as equal in value, whereas a majority owner views minority shares as worth far less per 
share tban majority stock, due to the inability of a minority interest to control the corpo-
ration. Jd. 
21 Ryan, 397 Mass. at 87, 489 N.E.2d at 1002. 
22 Jd. at 87-88, 489 N.E.2d at 1002-03. At the 1980 annual meeting of Gloucester, the 
shareholders voted to merge with Cape Pond Ice Co. (Cape Pond), a Massachusetts 
corporation in which Gloucester was the majority stockholder. Jd. at 87, 489 N.E.2d lit 
1002. Goode attended the meeting, but did not vote on the proposal. ld. In September of 
that year, the shareholders adopted a plan of liquidation and dissolution for Gloucester, 
which was later abandoned when Gloucester could not find a buyer for its assets. /d. Goode 
attended this meeting as well, but again he declined to vote on the proposal. Jd. Neither 
did he exercise his rights under chapter 1568, section 85, to obtain an appraisal of, and 
payment for, the Marr estate's share in Gloucester, based on the vote to merge at the 
annual meeting. Id. G.L. c. 1568, § 85 provides: 
A stockholder in any corporation organized under the laws of Massachusetts which 
shall have duly voted to consolidate or merge with another corporation or corpora-
tions under the provisions of sections seventy-eight or seventy-nine who objects to 
such consolidation or merger may demand payment for his stock from the resulting 
or surviving corporation and an appraisal in accordance with the provisions of 
sections eighty-six to ninety-eight, inclusive, and such stockholder and the resulting 
or surviving corporation shall have the rights and duties and follow the procedure 
set forth in those sections. This section shall not apply to the holders of any shares 
of stock of a constituent corporation surviving a merger if, as permitted by subsection 
(c) of section seventy-eight, the merger did not require for its approval a vote of the 
stockholders of the surviving corporation. 
23 Ryan, 397 Mass. at 87, 489 N.E.2d at 1002. 
24 Jd. at 86, 489 N.E.2d at 1002. 
25 Jd. at 87, 489 N.E.2d at 1002. 
26 ld. 
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stated that he had insufficient information to formulate a proposal and 
that the management of Gloucester was obligated to furnish him such 
information. 27 
Having reached no agreement, Goode filed suit, claiming that Glouces-
ter, or the majority shareholders, or both, were required to purchase the 
shares of stock in Alice Marr's estate. 28 While the suit was pending, 
Gloucester found a buyer for its assets, and the shareholders in June, 
1983, voted to sell substantially all the assets of Gloucester and to liq-
uidate and dissolve the corporation. 29 Goode did not exercise his statu-
tory rights of appraisal and payment. 30 The sale of assets was consum-
mated in August, 1983, and one month later Gloucester made a 
distribution of $136.50 a share to those shareholders who surrendered 
their stock certificates.31 Goode was not among them.J2 
A few weeks after the distribution, the defendants moved for partial 
summary judgment, claiming that neither the majority interest nor the 
corporation had a duty to purchase or to redeem stock of a minority 
shareholder. 33 A superior court judge allowed the motion, and Goode 
appealed. 34 In June, 1984, while Goode's appeal was pending, Gloucester 
made another distribution of $17.34 a share, and Gloucester was dis-
solved. 35 In October, Goode surrendered all the Gloucester shares in the 
Marr estate, receiving $153.84 a share, the total paid to other shareholders 
in the two liquidating distributions. 36 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted a request for direct appellate 
review and affirmed the judgment. 37 As an initial matter, defendants 
argued that because the plaintiff received his pro rata share of liquidating 
distributions in exchange for the surrender of his shares, plaintiff had 
received the relief he sought- his pro rata share of the Gloucester assets 
- and thus the appeal should be dismissed as moot. 38 The Court, how-
ever, found that a real controversy still existed.39 Assuming, stated the 
Court, that defendants were under a duty to make a reasonable offer to 
27 ld. 
28 I d. at 87-88, 489 N .E.2d at 1002-03. 
29 Id. at 88, 489 N.E.2d at 1003. 
30 ld. See supra note 22 for a discussion of Goode's previous refusal to exercise his 
statutory rights of appraisal and payment. 
31 ld. 
32 ld. 
33 ld. 
34 Id. 
35 ld. 
36 ld. 
37 Id. at 86, 489 N.E.2d at 1002. 
38 Id. at 88, 489 N.E.2d at 1003. 
39 Id. at 89, 489 N.E.2d at 1003. 
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purchase shares upon the death of a shareholder at the value they would 
have had at that time (April 1977), then redemption of the shares seven 
years after the original request did not render the issue moot. 40 
Having rejected defendant's argument that the appeal was moot, the 
Court began its analysis of the substantive issue by noting, as it had in. 
Donahue, that one of the identifying characteristics of a close corporation 
is the absence of a ready market for corporate stock. 41 A shareholder 
who is unhappy with management, observed the Court, or one who wants 
to convert his or her investment to cash, has only a limited number of 
opportunities for disposing of the stock.42 On the shareholder's death, 
the administrator of the shareholder's estate, left with shares which may 
have a high value in the estate but little dividend value for the beneficia-
ries, may encounter similar difficulties in selling the stock.43 In both 
situations, said the Court, the remaining shareholders or the corporation 
itself may be the only prospective purchasers for the minority shares.44 
The Court continued by contrasting the limited opportunities for mi-
nority shareholders in a close corporation to dispose of their interests, 
with the mechanisms available to investors in large, public-issue corpo-
rations or in a partnership. 45 A shareholder in a public corporation, 
observed the Court, can sell shares on the financial markets with no price 
disadvantage, and a partner can convert the investment to cash by dis-
solving the partnership. 46 Those options are unavailable to the minority 
shareholder in a close corporationY 
"'ld. 
41 Id. at 90, 489 N.E.2d at 1004. See Donahue, 367 Mass. at 586, 591, 328 N.E.2d at 5ll, 
514. 
42 Ryan, 397 Mass. at 90, 489 N.E.2d at 1004. See OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHARE-
HOLDERS, supra note 20, § 2:15, at 38 (the authors explain that there is no ready market 
for shares representing less than a controlling interest in a close corporation and that 
corporate dissension further lessens market interest in such shares). 
43 Ryan, 397 Mass. at 90, 489 N.E.2d at 1004. See also 2 F.H. O'NEAL, CLOSE CoRPo-
RATIONS§ 7.23, at 79 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter CLOSE CoRPORATIONS] (shares of a deceased 
minority shareholder may have a high value in the estate but have little dividend value for 
the heirs). 
44 Ryan, 397 Mass. at 90, 489 N.E.2d at 1004. See also CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra 
note 43, § 7.23, at 79; OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 20, § 2:15, 
at 38; Hornstein, Stockholder's Agreements in the Closely Held Corporation, 59 YALE L.J. 
1040, 1049 (1950) ("As a practical matter, remaining parties are usually the only prospective 
purchasers of stock in a closely held corporation."). 
45 Ryan, 397 Mass. at 90, 489 N.E.2d at 1004. 
46 Jd. 
47 Jd. Unlike the investor in a large, public-issue corporation, the minority shareholder 
in a close corporation is at a price disadvantage relative to majority shareholders, due to 
the Jack of a ready market. Thus, the minority shareholder cannot sell out and reinvest his 
or her cash. See OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 20, § 2:15, at 38. 
Nor can the minority shareholder dissolve the corporation as could a partner dissolve the 
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Having identified the plight of the minority shareholder in a close 
corporation, the Court nonetheless stated that in the absence of an agree-
ment among shareholders or with the corporation, or a provision in the 
articles of organization or by-laws, "neither the corporation nor a major-
ity of shareholders is under any obligation to purchase the shares of 
minority shareholders when minority shareholders wish to dispose of 
their interest in the corporation. "48 In refus\ng to require the corporation 
to purchase the minority shares in the absence of such an agreement or 
provision, the Court emphasized the lack of evidence of oppressive con-
duct on the part of the controlling shareholders directed at excluding the 
minority shareholders of the benefits derived from participation in cor-
porate affairs. 49 Unlike the minority shareholders in Donahue50 and 
Wilkes, 51 the deceased shareholder had neither held corporate office, nor 
served on the board of directors, nor received a salary from the corpo-
ration. 52 The majority shareholders, stated the Court, "made no effort to 
curtail, or interfere with, any benefits to which Marr or her estate was 
entitled as a minority shareholder in Gloucester. "53 Thus, concluded the 
Court, plaintiff was not the victim of a freeze-out. 54 The Court acknowl-
partnership. While a shareholder with a majority interest in a corporation may petition for 
the dissolution of the corporation for any reason under G.L. c. 156B, § 99(a), by definition 
that opportunity is not available to a minority shareholder. While forty percent of a cor-
poration's shareholders may bring a petition for dissolution of a corporation if the directors 
or shareholders are deadlocked under G.L. c. 156B, § 99(b), that provision would not help 
a minority shareholder who simply is unhappy with management or who wants to convert 
his or her shares into cash. 
48 Ryan, 397 Mass. at 90-91, 489 N.E.2d at 1004. For a decision discussing stock purchase 
agreements see Winchell v. Plywood Corp., 324 Mass. 171, 174-75, 85 N.E.2d 313, 315 
(1949) (a Massachusetts corporation, unless forbidden by statute, may purchase its own 
stock; agreements are enforceable if purchase is made in good faith and without prejudice 
to creditors and stockholders). See also Crimmins & Peirce v. Kidder Peabody Acceptance 
Corp., 282 Mass. 367, 376, 185 N.E. 383, 387 (1933) (right of redemption in principle is 
analogous to purchase by corporation of its own stock, which commonly is valid; contracts 
for redemption are unenforceable if the effect is to render the corporation insolvent). 
49 Ryan, 397 Mass. at 91, 489 N.E.2d at 1004. 
50 In Donahue the minority shareholder was an employee and corporate officer, although 
he never participated in the "management" aspect of the business. Donahue, 367 Mass. at 
581, 328 N.E.2d at 509. 
51 In Wilkes the minority shareholder was a director, corporate officer, and employee of 
the corporation. Wilkes, 370 Mass. at 843, 353 N.E.2d at 659. 
52 Ryan, 397 Mass. at 91, 489 N.E.2d at 1004-05. 
53 Id. at 91, 489 N.E.2d at 1005. See Hallahan v. Haltom Corp., 7 Mass. App. Ct. 68, 
70, 385 N.E.2d 1033, 1034 (1979) (peremptory discharge of minority shareholders without 
warning fell short of Donahue standard, where the principal benefit minority shareholders 
derived was as employees of the corporation). 
54 Ryan, 397 Mass. at 91-92 n.6, 489 N.E.2d at 1005 n.6. A "freeze-out" or "squeeze-
out" is "the use by some of the owners or participants in a business enterprise of strategic 
position, inside information, or powers of control, or the utilization of some legal device 
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edged that plaintiff's inability to dispose of the shares was "unfortunate," 
but in the absence of corporate or majority shareholder misconduct, the 
Court would not reallocate the risks inherent in the own~rship of stock 
in a close corporation.55 
The Court's unwillingness tointerfere in the refusal of the corporation 
to buy-out the deceased shareholder's shares is consistent with the Don-
ahue standard.56 The Donahue standard of "utmost good faith and loy-
alty" is aimed at reducing the ability of majority shareholders to disad-
vantage minority shareholders in the close corporationY Sueh 
disadvantages include the inadequacy of legal remedies to protect them 
from the abuses of the controlling group who both own and manage the 
corporation, and abuse of the relationship of "trust and confidence" more 
typical of relationships among shareholders in a close corporation than 
in a public corporation.58 In both situations, the disadvantage suffered 
by the minority shareholder must be attributable to misconduct by the 
majority interest. 
In Ryan the minority shareholder was not disadvantaged by the inad-
equacy of legal remedies to protect him from abuses of corporate man-
agement. 59 The lack of a market for the shares was not caused by the 
or technique, to eliminate from the enterprise one or more of its owners or participants." 
OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 20, § 1:01 at I. See Wilkes, 370 
Mass. at 849, 353 N.E.2d at 662 (an effective "freeze-out" device is to deprive minority 
shareholders of corporate offices and of employment with the corporation); Donahue, 367 
Mass. at 592, 328 N.E.2d at 515 (majority "freeze-out" schemes that withhold dividends 
are designed to compel minority to sell stock at less than fair value; when minority agrees, 
majority has won). 
55 Ryan, 397 Mass. at 92, 489 N.E.2d at 1005. ("[T]he situation was not caused by the 
defendants but is merely one of the risks of ownership of stock in a close corwration.") 
56 See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Donahue standard. 
57 See Elephante, Corporations, 1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 17.2, at 476. 
58 See Comment, Close Corporations- Stockholder's Duty of"Utmost Good Faith and 
Loyalty" Requires Controlling Shareholder Selling a Close Corporation its Own Shares to 
Cause the Corporation to Offer to Purchase a Ratable Number of Shares from Minority 
- Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 89 HARV. L. REV. 423, 425 (1975) [hereinafter 
Comment, Close Corporations]. The author identifies two themes in the Court's justifica-
tions for extending strict fiduciary liability to shareholders of a close corporation. /d. The 
first, "the inadequacy of legal remedies to protect minority stockholders from abuses arising 
from the conjunction of management and ownership in the controlling group," justifies 
close judicial supervision to guard against the risk that actions by the controlling share-
holders will be motivated by self-interest. /d. at 425-26. The second theme identified by 
the author is that "shareholders in a close corporation stand in a closer personal relationship 
than those in public corporations." /d. at 427. A duty to act with utmost good faith and 
loyalty thus upholds an ideal of corporate citizenship for the protection of the "common 
enjoyment of the benefits of the joint enterprise." /d. 
59 The plaintiff in Ryan twice declined to exercise his statutory rights of appraisal and 
payment when the shareholders voted to liquidate the corporation. See supra note 22 and 
accompanying text for discussion of the plaintiff's failure to exercise his statutory rights 
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controlling shareholders, but was simply a fact of ownership of such 
shares.60 Although the price per share offered to the shareholder's ad-
ministrator may have seemed inadequate to the minority shareholder, the 
disparity in valuation reflects what minority shares are worth to the 
majority.61 In this sense, -the disparity in valuation may be viewed as a 
permissible element of "selfish ownership," and does not necessarily 
constitute an abuse.62 In contrast, the majority shareholder in Donahue 
impermissibly exercised his selfish ownership to cause the corporation 
to buy his stock.63 
Nor was the treatment of plaintiff inconsistent with a standard of "trust 
and confidence" in shareholder relationships designed to protect the mi-
nority shareholder's enjoyment of the benefits of the common enter-
prise.64 As administrator of the minority shareholder's estate, plaintiff 
did not stand in a close personal relationship to the other shareholders, 
as might a shareholder who was an original party to the enterprise and 
who contributed his or her capital, skills, experience and labor.65 Alice 
Marr, the deceased shareholder, had never been an active member of the 
corporation. 66 In contrast to the minority shareholder in Wilkes who 
derived his primary benefits from employment in the corporation, Alice 
of appraisal and payment. When the plaintiff eventually surrendered his shares, he received 
the same amount per share as did all other shareholders. See supra note 36 and accom-
panying text for amount received by the plaintiff in distribution. Thus, he was not denied 
an opportunity available to other shareholders. The minority shareholder in Donahue, by 
contrast, was denied the opportunity to sell his shares, an opportunity extended to a member 
of the controlling group. Donahue, 367 Mass. at 603, 328 N.E.2d at 520. 
60 Ryan, 397 Mass. at 92, 489 N.E.2d at 1005. 
61 See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the valuation of 
majority and minority shares in a close corporation. 
62 Professors O'Neal and Thompson note that the "premium paid for stock constituting 
a controlling interest is recognized by appraisers." OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLD-
ERS, supra note 20, § 2:15, at 42 n.7. 
63 Donahue, 367 Mass. at 583, 328 N.E.2d at 510. 
64 See Comment, Close Corporations, supra note 58, at 427. The Court uses the fact that 
the plaintiff eventually received the same amount per share as did all other shareholders 
to demonstrate that the plaintiff was treated fairly by the majority shareholders. The use 
of this fact in support of the defendant's refusal to redeem the shares is inconsistent with 
the Court's conclusion that the payment to the plaintiff of his pro rata share of the 
corporation's assets did not moot the question as to whether the plaintiff's shares should 
have been redeemed seven years earlier. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
Nonetheless, the Court's conclusion that the defendants were not required to purchase or 
redeem the plaintiff's shares does not depend on the fact that the plaintiff was treated 
fairly seven years after his request. The Court's conclusion is more properly attributed to 
its finding that the plaintiff's inability to dispose of his stock is merely one of the risks of 
owning minority shares in a close corporation. Ryan, 397 Mass. at 92, 489 N.E.2d at 1005. 
65 See Wilkes, 370 Mass. at 852-53, 353 N.E.2d at 664. 
66 Ryan, 397·Mass. at 91, 489 N.E.2d at 1004-05. 
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Marr did not look to her investment in Gloucester as a means of obtaining 
benefits, such as employment or corporate office. 67 
The holding in Ryan demonstrates that attorneys cannot rely on the 
courts to reallocate the risks inherent in the ownership of minority shares. 
Instead, attorneys must provide for those risks by shareholder agreement 
or by a provision in the by-laws or articles of organization. 68 The require-
ment of an express agreement or governance provision to protect minor-
67 See Comment, supra note 58, at 427. 
68 As the Court in Ryan noted, the Statutory Close Corporation Supplement to the Model 
Business Corporation Act (Close Corporation Supplement) leaves stock buy-out arrange-
ments to the agreement of the parties by requiring a corporation to purchase shares from 
the estate of a deceased shareholder only if the articles of incorporation of the close 
corporation contain such a provision. 397 Mass. at 92, 489 N.E.2d at 1005. 
Section 14 of the Statutory Close Corporation Supplement to the Model Business Cor-
poration Act provides: 
(a) If the articles of incorporation of a statutory close corporation provide that 
this section shall apply to the corporation, the executor or administrator of the estate 
of any deceased shareholder shall, subject to any directions in the deceased share-
holder's last will and testament, have the right to require the corporation to elect 
either to purchase or cause the purchase of all, but not less than all, of the shares 
of the decedent pursuant to sections (d) through (f), or to be dissolved. 
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN., STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SUPP. § 14, (Proposed 
Official Draft 1981) reprinted in 38 Bus. LAW. 1031, 1032 (1983). 
The comments to this section state that it is designed to guarantee a buy-out at the death 
of a shareholder and that the decision to have any provision for mandatory buy-out is 
optional. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT, STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SUPP. § 14 comment I 
(Proposed Official Draft 1981) reprinted in 37 Bus. LAw. 269, 296 (1981). Designed to 
alleviate the problems caused by illiquidity of close corporation stock and the disputes 
which arise between the surviving shareholders and the successors in interest of a deceased 
shareholder, the advantage of electing section 14 is that: 
[l]t provides basic protection in the event the shareholders have failed to enter into 
an appropriate private agreement, or have a buy-out agreement but have failed to 
agree upon a buy-out price formula, or have a formula but have neglected to provide 
other necessary terms such as interest rates or number of installments in the event 
deferred purchases are authorized or necessary. This section does not prohibit the 
shareholders from having an all-inclusive private buy-out agreement drafted by 
competent counsel. An attorney may wish, however, to use the provisions of section 
14 as the basis of the agreement, making such additions and modifications as are 
deemed necessary. This procedure could substantially reduce the amount of drafting 
the attorney will have to undertake. 
/d. at 297. 
The Comments to the Close Corporation Supplement provision for shareholder sales 
option at death note that an attorney may prefer to draft a private buy-out agreement, using 
the Close Corporation Supplement provision as a model. Professor O'Neal notes that such 
buy-out obligations are usually provided through an agreement among the shareholders or 
among the shareholders and the corporation, rather than through a corporate governance 
provision. CLOSE CoRPORATIONS, supra note 43, § 7.23, at 79. A "buy-and-sell" agreement 
imposes an obligation to purchase on the surviving shareholders; a "stock-purchase" or 
"stock-retirement" agreement imposes the obligation on the corporation. /d. 
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ity shareholders may seem inconsistent with the operation of a close 
corporation where "informal understandings" frequently govern. 69 Such 
"informal understandings," however, can become misunderstandings 
upon the death of a shareholder.70 The advantage of pre-planning for the 
disposition of a stockholder's shares upon death is that subsequent dis-
putes regarding the shareholders' understandings can be avoided. 71 Not 
only can an agreement alleviate the inherent problems of an otherwise 
illiquid asset or an inadequate price, but it also can provide for the 
complexities of valuation, payment terms and tax consequences.72 
The Court's ruling in Ryan draws a line between active majority 
oppression of minority shareholders in a close corporation, and the in-
herent risks of minority ownership which exist even absent any oppres-
sion by the majority shareholders. Unlike the actions of the controlling 
group in Donahue and Wilkes, the controlling group in Ryan did not act 
to oppress the minority shareholder or to deprive the shareholder of 
benefits she had come to expect from her participation in the common 
enterprise. Rather, the problem of disposing of minority shares is a risk 
inherent in ownership of such shares and is not necessarily a disadvantage 
caused by the controlling group. The risk can be alleviated, short of 
imposing an obligation on the majority based on the fiduciary standard, 
by shareholder agreement or by a provision in the corporate governance 
provisions. Thus, the Ryan Court's refusal to reallocate the risk where 
the parties had not draws a line between the inherent risk of minority 
ownership and the fiduciary duties of the majority shareholders in a close 
corporation. 
§ 2.3. Valuation of Stock: Sarrouf v. New England Patriots Football 
Club, Inc.* Chapter 156B of Massachusetts General Laws enables stock-
holders to apply to the corporation in which they own stock for an 
69 See Hornstein, supra note 44, at 1041. 
70 See id. 
71 /d. 
72 For a discussion of provisions for determining selling price see id. at 1049-51. See also 
2 E. HOOD, S. KURTZ AND J. SHORS, CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS IN BUSINESS AND 
ESTATE PLANNING§ 8.1.2 (1982). According to the authors, a properly drawn plan can: 
(a) establish the value of the shares for both gift and estate tax purposes, 
(b) shift control of a deceased owner's interest to the surviving shareholders, 
(c) provide liquidity for the deceased stockholder's estate, 
(d) avoid loss of Subchapter S status if decedent's stock would otherwise pass in 
trust, 
(e) terminate the interest of the decedent's beneficiaries who have no prior con-
nection with the business and elimin.ate potential disaffected shareholders. 
/d. 
For a discussion of tax considerations in drafting a stock purchase agreement, see CLOSE 
CORPORATIONS, supra note 43, § 7.23, at 80. 
*Michael J. Southwick, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
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appraisal of their shares if the shareholders object to certain corporate 
action. 1 Upon formal application of appraisal, the shareholder is entitled 
to trade his stock to the corporation in exchange for the offered appraisal 
value or appeal the valuation to the superior court for further review. 2 
The Massachusetts state legislature enacted chapter 156B, sections 86-
98 in order to provide a method by which disgruntled shareholders might 
recover the value of their shares and terminate their relationship with 
the corporation. 3 Several formalities and technical rules must be exe-
cuted, however, before such objecting shareholders will be entitled to 
the appraised value of their shares.4 Furthermore, the value ultimately 
assigned by the court is a question of fact and will not be overturned 
unless the trial judge's determination of the value is clearly erroneous.5 
One standard of stock valuation in Massachusetts is the "Delaware 
block" approach. 6 This method, first used in Delaware, requires the trial 
judge to determine the price of shares in light of the corporation's earn-
ings, market price of stock and net asset value.? Although there has been 
a recent trend to abandon strict application of the "Delaware block" 
approach in favor of a more flexible standard which balances all the 
relevant facts of a particular case,8 the block approach remains a valid 
§ 2.3. 1 G.L. c. 156B, §§ 86-98 (West 1986). 
2 /d. The technical rules and formal requirements of these provisions are set out in greater 
detail infra note 4. 
3 See G.L. c. 156B, § 86. 
4 G.L. c. 156B, §§ 86-98. First, the shareholder must file a written notice of objection 
with the corporation before a vote is taken on the proposed action. G.L. c. 156B, § 86. 
Second, the dissenting shareholder cannot vote, or allow his shares to be voted, in favor 
of the proposed action. G.L. c. 156B, § 87. Therefore, if a shareholder is the beneficial 
owner, the owner of record being an agent, trustee or broker, the shares cannot be voted 
in favor of the action by anyone entitled to do so. See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying 
text. In light of this rule, it becomes incumbent upon a notified corporation to give notice 
to a dissenting shareholder that the action has become effective. G.L. c. 156B, § 88. See 
Sarroufv. New England Patriots Football Club, 397 Mass. 542,552,492 N.E.2d 1122, 1130 
(citing Matter of Bowman, 98 Misc. 2d 1028, 1034, 414 N.Y.S.2d 951, 955 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1978)). 
Third, the shareholder must demand payment for his shares within twenty days of notice 
that the action has become effective. G.L. c. 156B, § 89. At this point the shareholder is 
entitled to receive the full appraised value for his shares within thirty days ofthe expiration 
of the demand period. G.L. c. 156B, § 89. Finally, if an agreement with the corporation is 
not reached within the prescribed time period, both the corporation and the shareholder 
are entitled to bring a suit in equity to determine the value of the shares. G.L. c. 156B, 
§ 90. Such suit will be brought in the superior court of the county in which the corporation 
has its principal office. I d. 
5 Sarrouf v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 397 Mass. 542, 550, 492 N.E.2d 
1122, 1128 (1986). 
6 See id. at 547-48,492 N.E.2d at 1127. 
7 Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 377 Mass. 719, 724, 387 N.E.2d 1145, 1148 
(1979). 
8 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983). In Weinberger, the 
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method of valuation in Massachusetts.9 Under this approach, it is strictly 
up to the trial judge to determine the relative weights to be given to each 
of the three factors in determining the value of the stock. 10 
During the Survey year, in Sarrouf v. New England Patriots Football 
Club, Inc., the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the trial judge's determi-
nation of the value of dissenting shareholders' stock under the Delaware 
block approach.ll In its opinion, the Court held that the trial court's 
assignment of the relevant weights to the three factors was not clearly 
erroneous under the circumstances. 12 Additionally, the Court upheld the 
award of compound interest on the judgment.B Finally, the Court re-
versed the trial court's decision excluding beneficial owners from the 
suit14 but upheld the exclusion of various shareholders who had failed to 
comply with the provisions of chapter 156B. 15 In its decision, the Court 
granted a great deal of discretion to the trial judge and acknowledged the 
unique problems that arise in evaluating the price of shares in a profes-
sional football franchise. 16 
The facts of the Sarrouf case centered around the financial dealings of 
William Sullivan and his attempt to acquire and retain full control of the 
New England Patriots organization. 17 Prior to 1974, two classes of out-
standing Patriots stock existed. 18 In 1974, after being ousted as president 
Delaware Supreme Court did not invalidate the block approach but rather indicated that 
valuation should not be conducted exclusively by that method. In short, the Court in that 
case held that a better mode of analysis would be to balance all of the relevant factors 
which impact on the price of shares. /d. at 713. Although the Delaware decisions are not 
binding in Massachusetts, the issues handled in the Delaware courts are often illustrative 
of common problems encountered in all jurisdictions and the decisions handed down are 
often very instructive for practitioners everywhere. HENN AND ALEXANDER, LAWS OF 
CORPORATIONS 185-86 (3d ed. West 1983). 
9 Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 547, 492 N.E.2d at 1126. 
10 See id. at 544, 492 N.E.2d at 1125 (citing Piemonte, 377 Mass. at 724, 387 N.E.2d at 
1148; Martignette v. Sagamore Mfg. Co., 340 Mass. 136, 142-43, 163 N.E.2d 9, 13 (1959)). 
11 397 Mass. 542, 554,492 N.E.2d 1122, 1130 (1986). 
12 /d. at 550-51, 492 N.E.2d at 1128. The trial judge assigned the following weights to 
the three factors: market value-5%, eamings-5%, net asset value-90%. /d. at 548 n.9, 492 
N.E.2d at 1127 n.9. 
13 Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 551, 492 N.E.2d at 1128-29. Interest on any award is to be paid 
from the date of the vote approving the corporate action. See G.L. c. 156B, § 95. 
14 Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 551-53, 492 N.E.2d at 1129-30. 
15 /d. at 553-54, 492 N.E.2d at 1130. See generally G.L. c. 156B, §§ 86-98 (rules gov-
. eming all aspects of the appraisal procedures). 
16 Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 549-50, 492 N.E.2d at 1128. 
17 The facts of this case are laid out in full detail in Coggins v. New England Patriots 
Football Club, Inc., 397 Mass. 525, 526-29,492 N.E.2d 1112, 1114-16 (1986). These facts 
have been the subject of several suits in the Massachusetts courts. See, e.g., Coggins, 397 
Mass. 525, 492 N .E.2d 1112 (1986); Pavlidis v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 
737 F.2d 1227 (l st Cir. 1984). 
18 The two classes of stock referred to here were voting, 100% of which was held by 
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of the organization, Sullivan purchased all ofthe outstanding voting stock 
at a price of $102 per share. 19 He then created a new organization (New 
Patriots) and, in an effort to totally eliminate the non-voting shares, 
sought to merge the two corporations. 20 As part of the merger agreement, 
Sullivan offered to exchange non-voting stock in the Old Patriots for $15 
per share. 21 In addition Sullivan secured the transfer of his 100% holding 
of Old Patriots voting stock for 100% of the newly issued stock in the 
New Patriots. 22 
Plaintiff stockholders in Sarrouf sought review in Norfolk Superior 
Court in order to appeal the $15 per share offer by Sullivan.23 In search 
of the "fair value"24 of the shares, the trial judge employed the Delaware 
block method of valuation. 25 The judge found the market value of the 
shares and the earnings of the corporation to be of relatively little signif-
icance and therefore assigned a weight of five percent to each of these 
components. 26 The market value of the shares was deemed insignificant 
because of the limited amount of trading in the shares by a small number 
of investorsY Similarly, the earnings were of "little or no consequence" 
because potential purchasers of the club, according to the court, would 
likely be willing to pay a premium, regardless of current or projected 
earnings, for the right to become members in the elite group of franchise 
owners. 28 The court concluded, therefore, that the net asset value of the 
organization as a going concern was the most important factor to be 
considered in this particular valuation and thus the remaining 90% weight 
was assigned to that element. 29 Using the resulting weighted average, the 
Sullivan, then the President of the Patriots organization, and nine other investors, and non-
voting stock which was held by Sullivan and the plaintiffs in this and other suits against 
the Patriots. Coggins, 397 Mass. at 527-28,492 N.E.2d at 1114-15. Both classes of stock 
enjoyed identical rights and privileges but for the power to vote which was held exclusively 
by the voting shares. Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 545, 492 N.E.2d at 1125. 
19 Coggins, 397 Mass. at 527,492 N.E.2d at 1114. 
20 /d. at 528,492 N.E.2d at 1115. 
21 /d. 
22Jd. 
23 Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 543, 492 N.E.2d at 1124. 
24 /d. at 545, 492 N.E.2d at 1125. 
2
' Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 548 n.9, 492 N.E.2d at 1127 n.9. 
26Jd. 
27 /d. at 548, 492 N.E.2d at 1127. In cases such as Sarrouf, where there is not a widely 
held and active market, other factors such as earnings and net assets become more impor-
tant to the valuation process. /d. at 544, 492 N.E.2d at 1125. As the Court in Sarrouf 
pointed out by quoting the trial judge, "it is for the fact-fiiiaer in the particular case to 
determine the weight of the relevant factors." /d. (citing Piemonte, 377 Mass. at 724, 387 
N.E.2d at 1148; Martignette, 340 Mass. at 142-43, 163 N.E.2d at 13). 
28 Id. at 544-46, 492 N.E.2d at 1125-26. 
29 See id. at 548 n.9, 492 N.E.2d at 1127 n.9. 
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trial judge found each non-voting share in the Old Patriots organization 
to be worth $80. 3o 
the trial court found a conservative estimate of the Old Patriots' net 
asset value to be $19 millionY Dividing this figure by the total number 
of outstanding shares, the court reached a value of $85.51 per share 
which, when assigned to 90% of the weighted average, accounted for 
$76.80 of the total $80 per share.32 This amount, $76.80, was then com· 
bined with the court's finding of $1.19 per share for earnings and $.75 
per share for market value for a total of $78.74 which the court rounded 
off to $80 per share. 33 
The Supreme Judicial Court had faced a similar valuation problem in 
the 1979 case of Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp .. 34 In Piemonte, 
the Court determined that the earnings factor was less important than 
the net asset value because a sports franchise is a somewhat unique 
corporate structure which relies more on its assets for value than its 
earnings. 35 the Piemonte Court also held that earnings were of little 
significance because the corporation was largely a family run organiza-
tion.36 In light of these facts, facts which parallel those in Sarrouffairly 
closely, the Piemonte Court held that the earnings and net asset value of 
the Boston Garden Corp. should be weighted 40% and 50% respectivelyY 
In Sarrouf, the trial court decided that the earnings and net asset value 
of the Patriots should be weighted at 5% and 90% respectively and found 
the per share value of the organization to be $80. 
The trial court in Sarroufwent on to award plaintiffs compound interest 
30 The actual value reached by the trial court was $78.74 which was rounded off to $80. 
This value was reached by adding the value of $76.80 for net asset value, to $1.19 ($23.90 
x 5%) per share for earnings and $.75 ($15 x 5%) per share for market value. 
Earnings per share are calculated by averaging the earnings over the past several years 
(usually five) and multiplying that figure by a multiplier which is determined at the discretion 
of the court in light of industry wide risks and future prospects. See Piemonte, 377 Mass. 
at 726-29, 387 N.E.2d at 1149-51; Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal 
Statutes, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1453, 1467 (1966). 
31 Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 548, 492 N .E.2d at 1127. The trial court found, in light of all the 
evidence, that the value of the net assets belonging to the Old Patriots was between $19 
and $22 million. The choice of the lower figure was not held to be reversible error by the 
Supreme Judicial Court. /d. 
32 Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 548 n.9, 492 N.E.2d at 1127 n.9. The net asset value was divided 
by the total number of both the voting and non-voting stock, because all of the shares 
enjoyed identical rights but for the power to vote. Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 545, 492 N.E.2d 
at 1125. 
33 Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 548 n.9, 492 N .E.2d at 1127 n.9. 
34 377 Mass. at 719, 387 N.E.2d at 1145. 
35 /d. at 733-34, 387 N.E.2d at 1153. 
36 /d. 
37 /d. at 733, 387 N.E.2d at 1153. 
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from the date of the vote approving the merger of the two corporations. 38 
Finally, the court excluded various plaintiffs from the action. 39 The ex-
cluded plaintiffs had either held their shares in "street name" only, that 
is were beneficial owners and not owners of record, or had failed to 
comply with the provisions of chapter 156B.40 
The defendant corporation appealed the trial court's valuation and 
award of compound interest to the Supreme Judicial Court.41 Specifically, 
the defendant urged that the trial judge violated chapter 156B, section 92 
because the value of $80 per share "gave effect to the results of the 
corporate merger to which plaintiffs objected."42 Additionally, defendant 
objected to the $80 per share valuation and 90% weight attributed to the 
net asset value of the corporation as a going concern under the Delaware 
block approach. 43 Finally, defendant sought to invalidate the award of 
compound, rather than simple, interest on the judgment.44 
The Supreme Judicial Court, after acknowledging the validity of the 
Delaware block approach,45 examined the method by which the trial court 
applied the Delaware block analysis to the facts of this case. 46 The Court 
reasoned that it was within the court's discretion, in light of all the 
circumstances, to assign a 90% weight to the net asset value while as-
signing very little weight to the market value and earnings componentsY 
38 Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 546, 492 N.E.2d at 1126. 
39 Sarrouj; 397 Mass. at 551-54, 492 N.E.2d at 1129-30. The trial judge also determined 
that several plaintiffs were excluded from the appraisal action. /d. See infra notes 64-79 
and accompanying text for the Supreme Judicial Court's findings as to these exclusions. 
40 See id. at 546, 492 N .E.2d at 1126. 
41 !d. at 546, 492 N .E.2d at 1126. 
42 /d. G.L. c. 156B, § 92 provides in pertinent part: 
The value of the shares shall be determined as of the day preceding the day of the 
vote approving the proposed corporate action and shall be exclusive of any element 
of value arising from the expectation or accomplishment of the proposed corporate 
action. (emphasis added). 
43 See Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 546, 492 N.E.2d at 1126. Additionally, defendant argued 
with the trial court's determination that the net asset value of the Patriots as a going 
concern was $19 million. 
44 /d. Plaintiffs urged that the trial court opinion be upheld except for the exclusion of 
several shareholders. ld. at 547, 492 N.E.2d at 1126. 
45 /d. at 547-48, 492 N .E.2d at 1127. Although the Court in Pie monte did approve the 
Delaware block method it did not require the use of that technique in all valuation cases. 
/d. Accord Leader v. Hycor, Inc., 395 Mass. 215, 479 N.E.2d 173 (1985). Interestingly, the 
SarroufCourt mentioned in a footnote that Delaware has recently abandoned the exclusive 
use of the block approach in favor of a more flexible analysis which seeks to determine 
value through the use of "generally accepted techniques." Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 547 n.8, 
492 N.E.2d at 1127 n.8. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712-13. Such techniques might include 
a comparative analysis of premium paid over market value in ten other merger-offer 
combinations or a discounted cash flow analysis. /d. at 712. 
46 Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 544-47, 492 N.E.2d at 1125-26. 
47 /d. at 548-51, 492 N.E.2d at 1127-28. 
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In making such a determination, the Court held, the trial judge has 
discretion in assigning the weights to the relevant factors48 and will not 
be overturned unless his or her findings are clearly erroneous.49 
The Court agreed with the lower court that the most important factor, 
using the block approach, in the valuation of the stock of a National 
Football League team is the net asset value of the club as a going 
concem.50 The Court thus rejected defendant's objections to both the 
assignment of a 90% weight and the finding of $19 million as the net asset 
value. 51 The Court concluded that the judge's determinations were not 
clearly erroneous in light of the particular circumstances of the case and 
therefore deferred to his discretion in finding a value of $80 per share. 52 
The Supreme Judicial Court next addressed the trial court's finding 
that market value is only an accurate indicator of price in cases where 
the stock is widely held and actively traded by informed investors. 53 The 
Court explained that where the shares are not widely held, as in the case 
of the Old Patriots, a judge would have to reconstruct a hypothetical 
market in order'to estimate the market price for the shares. 54 The Court 
in Sarrouf noted that such a requirement is unnecessary because in 
constructing such a hypothetical market, the trial judge would merely be 
duplicating the analysis of earnings and net asset value. 55 Moreover, the 
Court pointed out that it had held previously in the 1959 case of Martig-
nette v. Sagamore Mfg. Co.56 that even where an actual market does 
exist, it is up to the discretion of the fact-finder to determine the weight 
and relative importance of the various factors involved in a particular 
case. 57 In light of the absence of an active market for Old Patriots stock, 
the Court thus affirmed the lower court's assignment of a small weight 
to the $15 per share price.58 
48/d. at 544-49, 492 N.E.2d at 1125-28. 
49 I d. at 550, 492 N .E.2d at 1128. 
sold. at 548, 492 N.E.2d at 1127. 
"Id. at 546-48, 492 N.E.2d at 1126-27. 
52 See Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 547-51, 492 N.E.2d at 1126-28. See supra note 30 and 
accompanying text for a detailed accounting of the trial court's calculations. See infra note 
65 and accompanying text for a discussion of some of the unique circumstances affecting 
this case. 
53 See Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 548-49, 492 N.E.2d at 1127 (citing Martignette, 340 Mass. 
at 141-42, 163 N.E.2d at 12-13). 
sc Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 549, 492 N.E.2d at 1127. 
55 Id. See also Piemonte, 377 Mass. at 725, 387 N.E.2d at 1149. 
56 340 Mass. at 136, 163 N.E.2d at 9. 
57 Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 549, 492 N.E.2d at 1127 (citing Martignette, 340 Mass. at 142, 
163 N.E.2d at 13). 
58 Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 548-49, 492 N.E.2d at 1127-28. The $15 per share was used as 
the "market price" because it represented Sullivan's own offer on the merger. See id. at 
548 n.9, 492 N.E.2d at 1127 n.9. 
24
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1986 [1986], Art. 5
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1986/iss1/5
§ 2.3 CORPORATIONS 49 
Finally, in considering the earnings of the Old Patriots, the Court 
agreed that the sale of a football franchise is a unique transaction and 
one for which the earnings of the corporation do not represent the actual 
value of the shares. 59 Potential purchasers of the enterprise, the Court 
explained, would look less toward the earnings of the club than to the 
prestige and recognition that seem to accompany ownership automati-
cally.60 Thus, reasoned the Court, the amount that an individual would 
be willing to pay for a franchise may not reflect the earnings that the 
club has received, or will receive.61 The Court recognized that partial 
owners of a franchise, such as the plaintiffs in this case, should not be 
forced to suffer a deflated price for their shares merely because the 
earnings history of the corporation is not an accurate reflection of the 
value of their holdings in the corporation. 62 The Court concluded, there-
fore, that the trial judge acted within his discretion in attributing a 5% 
weight to the earnings portion of the valuation.63 
The Court stated that the trial judge was justified, in reaching his own 
conclusion as to value, in looking beyond the limited Delaware block 
considerations to all the evidence before him including recent purchase 
prices of other NFL franchises. 64 The Court concluded that in light of 
the particular circumstances,65 the trial judge's valuation was not in 
error. 66 Such an analysis of the totality of the circumstances the Court 
noted, is helpful to the judge in determining an accurate net asset value 
in his search for a fair value for the shares. Because valuation is a 
question of fact, the Court could not overturn the lower court's decision 
59 Sarrouj, 397 Mass. at 549, 492 N.E.2d at ll28. 
60 Id. The Court noted here that: 
I d. 
[Ownership of an NFL franchise] is not only a business venture, but, as the judge 
pointed out, a sportsman's endeavor. A team owner is a celebrity, a member of an 
exclusive club. By the use of his capital, the armchair athlete may become a partic-
ipant in the public spectacle of professional sports. Most teams are owned outright 
by extremely wealthy individuals. 
61 Id. at 549, 492 N.E.2d at ll28. 
62 Id. at 549-50, 492 N.E.2d at ll28. 
63 Id. at 549-51, 492 N.E.2d at ll28. 
64 I d. at 550, 492 N .E.2d at 1128. The two deals specifically mentioned by the Court were 
the 1974 transactions which created the Seattle Seahawks and the Tampa Bay Buccaneers 
each of which sold for $16 million. 
65 Id. Such particular facts impacting uniquely on the Patriots included the monopoly 
e!Uoyed by the club over all of New England; the marked increase in operating revenue 
and operating income between 1973 and 1975; the value of the stadium lease; valuable 
television contracts; concessions contracts; interest and support in the community; player 
contracts and the caliber of the athletes on the team which indicated a positive future for 
the club. Id. at 550, 492 N.E.2d at ll28. 
66 Sarrouj, 397 Mass. at 551, 492 N.E.2d at ll28. 
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unless it was "cl~arly erroneous" and not warranted by the evidence.67 
In light of this constraint, the Court found no reversible error in the 
superior court's use of the Delaware block method of valuation or in the 
ultimate finding of $80 per share.68 
Having approved the trial court's use and application of the Delaware 
blo~k method, the Court next turned to the question of interest and 
upheld the trial court's award of compound interest.69 As sections 92 and 
95 of chapter 156B are silent as to whether the interest award should be 
simple or compounded, the Court again left the issue to the discretion of 
the trial judge and found his decision not clearly erroneous. 70 The Court 
reasoned that the award of interest, generally, is an equitable remedy 
and a judge acts within reason when he or she decides to grant compound 
interest if he or she finds that it is necessary to fairly compensate the 
plaintiff for the losses incurred.71 The Court pointed out that a judge 
should consider the inability of the plaintiffs to use the money during the 
interim period between the corporate action and the suit. 72 Moreover, 
the Court indicated that a plaintiff is entitled to that return which could 
have been earned by a prudent investor during that same period.73 
Finally, in determining the validity of the trial court's exclusion of 
various plaintiffs, the Court in Sarrouftelied on the language and intent 
of chapter 156B in determining the valldliyof the trial court's exclusion 
of various plaintiffs from the appraisal proceedings.74 The Court's pri-
mary holding on this issue was that beneficial owners of stock may file 
a written objection with the corporation even though their name might 
not appear as the holders of record on the books of the corporation.75 
67 ld. at 550-51, 492 N.E.2d at 1128 (citing Leader v. Hycor, 395 Mass. at 223, 479 
N.E.2d at 178). 
68 Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 551, 492 N.E.2d at 1128. 
69 Id. at 551, 492 N.E.2d at 1128-29. 
70 ld. at 551, 492 N.E.2d at 1129. G.L. c. 1568, § 92 states only that the court "shall 
order the corporation to make payment of such.value, together with interest, if any, as 
herein provided .... "Similarly,§ 95 provides only that "[i]nterest shall be paid upon any 
award from the date of the vote approving the proposed corporate action, and the court 
may on application of any interested party determine the amount of interest to be paid in 
the case of any stockholder." 
71 Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 551,492 N.E.2d at 1129. Accord Shulkin v. Shulkin, 301 Mass. 
184, 195, 16 N.E.2d 644, 652 (1938). 
72 Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 551, 492 N.E.2d at 1129 (citing Piemonte, 377 Mass. at 735, 387 
N.E.2d at 1154). 
73 ld. (citing Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 222 
(Del. 1975) and Grant, Appraisal Rights: Allowance for Prejudgment Interest, 17 B.C. 
INous. & CoM. L. REv. 1 (1975)). 
74 Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 551-52, 492 N.E.2d at 1129. See supra notes 3-4 and accom-
panying text for an explanation of the rules governing appraisal rights. 
75 !d. at 552, 492 N .E.2d at 1129-30. Thus the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the trial 
26
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1986 [1986], Art. 5
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1986/iss1/5
§ 2.3 CORPORATIONS 51 
The Court pointed out that the only purpose of the written objection was 
to put the corporation on notice of possible dissenters to the corporate 
action.76 The intent behind the statute is to provide shareholders with 
"an equitable, simple and expeditious remedy" and therefore "should not 
be construed strictly against them. "77 Moreover, the Court pointed out 
that once the corporation is on notice of the dissension, although it can 
still seek further proof of beneficial ownership, it cannot ignore the 
existence of the shareholders' rights.78 The Court thus reversed the trial 
court's exclusion of those plaintiffs who were holding the shares in "street 
name" only. 79 
In analyzing the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Sarrouf, the 
primary issue is whether or not the trial judge actually exercised his 
court's denial of an action by an owner holding in "street name" stating that the trial court 
was being "unduly strict" on the beneficial owner. ld. at 552, 492 N.E.2d at 1129. 
76 ld. This notice does not necessarily represent a firm indication as to who the actual 
dissenters will be at the vote because all shareholders remain free to change their mind at 
any time preceding the formal vote. Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 552, 492 N:E.2d at 1129 (citing 
Raab v. Villager Indus. Inc., 355 A.2d 888, 891, 893 (Del.), cert. denied sub nom., Mitchell 
v. Villager Indus. Inc., 429 U.S. 853 (1976)). 
77 Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 552, 492 N.E.2d at 1129. 
78 Id. (citing Matter of Bowman, 98 Misc. 2d at 1034, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 955). 
79 Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 552, 492 N .E.2d at 1130. Other exclusions were analyzed by the 
Court strictly by the letter of chapter 156B. Jd. at 553-54, 492 N.E.2d at 1130. Several 
shareholders were denied appraisal because their written objections were received after 
the vote. Id. at 553, 492 N.E.2d at 1130. In another case, the shareholder had already 
accepted the offer of $15 per share by Sullivan. ld. Once the offer was accepted, the 
objecting shareholder was precluded by statute from entering the action. See G.L. c. 156B, 
§ 91. In these cases the exclusions by the lower court were affirmed. Sarrouf, 397 Mass. 
at 553, 492 N.E.2d at 1130. 
Additionally, the Court reversed the exclusion of a plaintiff who was denied relief because 
he had failed to file a written demand of appraisal within the twenty day notification of 
effectiveness period. Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 553, 492 N.E.2d at 1130. G.L. c. 156B, § 89. 
G.L. c. 156B, § 88 requires the corporation, upon notice of dissension, to notify the 
stockholders that the corporate action to which they object has become effective. In 
Sarrouf, the shareholder was never notified that the merger had been approved by the 
board and therefore the twenty day limitation period of demand for appraisal never beaan 
to run against him. The Court therefore held that the shareholder's failure to respond within 
the twenty day period was no ground to deny him relief in this case. Sarrouf, 397 Mass. 
at 553, 492 N.E.2d at 1130. Similarly, the Court reversed the exclusion of plaintiffs who 
had indicated their dissension through handwritten notes on the proxy cards sent by the 
defendant. /d. Finding that the shareholders had indeed voiced their objection to the 
proposed corporate action, the Court reasoned, as it had done in analyzing the beneficial 
owner problem, see supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text, that the purpose, if not the 
letter, of the statute was fulfilled by the shareholders and therefore they should not be 
denied relief. Id. The Court was unable to determine the reason for the exclusion Of one 
individual plaintiff and therefore remanded his case for a determination not inconsistent 
with the other holdings and principles laid out in the opinion. Id. at 554, 492 N.E.2d at 
113Q-3l. 
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discretion in a reasonable fashion. The lower court couched its decision 
in the Delaware block approach and used the totality of the record before 
it in making its decision. 80 The single most glaring problem in this anal-
ysis, which was apparently accepted without question by the Supreme 
Judicial Court, was the assignment of a 5% weight to the earnings com-
ponent.81 
The finding by the trial court that the nature of a professional football 
club attracts a unique type of owner82 more interested in prestige than 
earnings is not, on its face, unreasonable. Nonetheless, the realm of 
reason seems to have been stretched to its outermost limits in holding 
that a potential purchaser would only attribute 5% of his concern to the 
earnings of the franchise he or she was about to buy.83 Stock valuation 
is up to the discretion of the trial judge in light of the record before him 
and the Court will defer to that judgment unless it is clearly erroneous. 
Any discretionary determination, especially under the unique circum-
stances of Sarrouf, is likely to result in a wide array of varying conclu-
sions. Nonetheless, there must be some point at which the Supreme 
Judicial Court recognizes the inconsistency and unpredictability that ac-
companies this broad deference and steps in to hold the trial court to a 
higher standard. Thus, even conceding that purchasers of a football 
franchise would be somewhat less interested in earnings than a purchaser 
of a normal business, the fact remains that a football franchise is a 
business and those seeking to buy a club are not, perhaps, as unconcerned 
in this element as the Court would have us believe. 
Normally, an appellate court will defer to the judgment and discretion 
of the trial court because the trial judge is in a better position to weigh 
all the evidence. 84 In the case of stock valuation, however, this reasoning 
does not necessarily hold true. Indeed, as the evidence in these cases 
will largely consist of financial statements and economic predictions, 
there is no reason to believe that the appellate court cannot reassess the 
80 Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 548-52, 492 N.E.2d at 1127-28. 
81 /d. at 548 n.9, 492 N.E.2d at 1127 n.9. The assignment of a 5% weight to the market 
value element in Sarrouf, is less notable in light of the inactive trading in Old Patriots stock 
and the relatively small number of stockholders. Compare Sarrouf with Piemonte, 377 
Mass. at 725-26, 733, 387 N.E.2d at 1143, 1152 (market value weight set at 10% in light of 
limited trading on a largely closed market). 
82 Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 545, 549, 492 N.E.2d at 1125, 1128. 
83 See Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARV. L. REv. 
1453, 1470 (1966). In this article, the author points out that "typical" weights might be as 
follows: market value-35%, earnings-35%, net asset value-30%. These weights will nec-
essarily have to be varied in order to fit the particular circumstances of an individual case. 
Naturally the importance of one element will be directly affected by an increase or decrease 
in the relative importance of one of the other elements. /d. at 1471. 
84 See infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
28
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1986 [1986], Art. 5
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1986/iss1/5
§ 2.3 CORPORATIONS 53 
figures if they appear to be unreasonable. Certainly it is not appropriate 
for the appellate court to reanalyze every stock valuation conducted by 
the lower court. This article only suggests that where the value reached 
by the court seems to be facially unreasonable, the appellate court should 
not refrain from a closer analysis. 
Perhaps a better test than the "clearly erroneous" standard in these 
cases would be for the appellate court to defer to the trial court's discre-
tion unless the variation in weights assigned to the Delaware block factors 
exceeds a certain margin. Thus if any one factor was weighted 50% more 
than either of the other two, the court would recalculate the valuation 
on its own to make sure the trial judge's finding was indeed reasonable 
in light of all the circumstances. In Sarrouf, therefore, the assignment of 
a 90% weight to net asset value would have activated a higher standard 
of review. 
The problem in stock valuation cases is that there are so many different 
variables and circumstances affecting the price of shares that without 
some kind of meaningful review on appeal the trial court is virtually free 
to find any value it desires. Because there are so many factors involved, 
it will be extremely unlikely that an appellate court will find a trial court's 
determination to be unreasonable under the clearly erroneous standard. 
For this reason it is necessary for the Court to step in in certain situations 
to add some element of consistency and predictability to the proceedings. 
Despite the similarity between the fact patterns of Piemonte and Sar-
rouf, the Court found no reversible error in weighting the earnings of the 
Old Patriots at only 5% in Sarrouf. Even if one accepts, as a consequence 
of judicial discretion, the possibility of differing results in similar fact 
patterns, 85 the Court in Sarrouf should have questioned the 5% weight 
more closely especially in light of the fact that in Piemonte, the outcome 
of which the Court admits controls its decision in Sarrouf, 86 the earnings 
were weighted at 40%. 87 
The cornerstone of the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Sarrouf 
is that the trial judge's determination of the value of the Old Patriots 
shares was valid as long as the method used was reasonable and the 
result not clearly erroneous.88 The primary goal of stock valuation is to 
provide a method by which disgruntled stockholders might recover the 
value of their shares and terminate their relationship with the corporation. 
The key to determining "fair value," as well as reaching an overall 
85 Indeed, the Court in Piemonte held that "we would have found no fault with a deter-
mination to give even greater weight to the price per share based on the net asset value of 
Garderi Arena .... " 377 Mass. at 734, 387 N.E.2d at 1153. 
86 Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 547-48, 492 N.E.2d at 1126-27. 
87 Piemonte, 377 Mass. at 733, 387 N.E.2d at 1153. 
88 Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 550-51, 492 N.E.2d at 1128. 
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equitable solution in light of the particular circumstances of the case, 
appears to depend on a careful and thoughtful analysis of the evidentiary 
record. 89 Sarrouf shows that the Court will not overturn a trial court's 
finding of fact provided that such findings are reasonably supported by 
the record and the rational inferences that can be drawn from it.90 Thus 
the trial judge's powers of analysis and decision are further enhanced by 
his or her exclusive ability to review the entire record and balance all of 
the relevant factors in reaching what he or she perceives to be an equi-
table remedy. 91 
The conclusion reached in Sarrouf has both a negative and a positive 
effect on Massachusetts law. The negative impact is that with so much 
deference afforded to the trial court, the possibility of unpredictable, 
inconsistent, and even somewhat arbitrary decisions is great and practi-
tioners may find themselves in the untenable position of not knowing 
what to expect for their client. Conversely, on the positive side, there is 
a great opportunity for creative lawyers to interpret the facts in a light 
most favorable to their client and persuade the court to support their 
position. 
The issue of stock valuation is a common one and one which is likely 
to continue to appear in the Massachusetts courts. As an equitable rem-
edy by which disgruntled shareholders seek compensation, appraisal 
rights represent an important asset to the financial investing community. 
As in all equity cases, however, the Supreme Judicial Court will be faced 
with questions of fact that have already been carefully scrutinized and 
analyzed at the lower court level. Although reason and discretion are 
malleable concepts which expand and contract with every piece of new 
evidence which is proffered, the Court should be mindful of the freedom 
and power of the trial courts and strive to protect and preserve the reason 
and rationality behind these decisions. As long as the trial courts continue 
to be upheld uhless clearly erroneous, however, the future of stock 
valuation in Massachusetts will continue to be the result of specific fact 
pattern analysis and creative argument by the corporate bar. 
89 See generally Sarrouf, in which the Court permitted the trial judge to examine the 
entire record in determining the appropriate allocation of weights and values under the 
Delaware block approach. Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 550, 492 N .E.2d at 1128. 
90 See Sarrouf, 550-31, 492 N.E.2d at ll28. See also Building Inspector of Lancaster v. 
Sandersen, 372 Mass. 157, 161,360 N.E.2d 1051, 1054 (1977) (reasoning that the trial judge 
is "in a superior position to appraise and weigh the evidence" than is the appellate court). 
91 See Sarrouf, 397 Mass. at 549, 492 N.E.2d at ll27. This trend toward broadening the 
reach and power of the trial court is not unique to Massachusetts. Indeed, even in Delaware, 
where the block approach originated, the courts have abandoned their exclusive reliance 
on the block method in favor of the more flexible "all relevant factors" test which empha-
sizes fairness in both dealing and price. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713 (courts should 
consider "all relevant factors" in evaluating stock prices). See also Universal City Studios, 
334 A.2d 216 (use of 16.1 as a multiplier held valid in light of all relevant circumstances). 
30
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1986 [1986], Art. 5
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1986/iss1/5
